[카테고리:] Formosa

2월 28일은 대만의 공휴일 , 화평기념일 이라서 , 저녁도 먹을겸 고속철도를 타고 도원의 ikea를 다녀왔다 . 신용카드 혜택중에 고속철도 비지니스 석을 싸게 이용할수 있는 게 있어서 고속철도를 탈때 면 비지니스석을 매번 이용하는데 , 비지니스 석의 혜택이라고 하면 , 비행기의 비지니스를 탈때에 해당하는 비슷한 것들이 있는데 , 자리로 넓고 타고 내리는 곳이 바로 역의 통로앞인것이 메인이긴 하지만 , 간식과 음료수를 제공하는게 다른점이다.

위의 두 스낵이 오늘 갈때 와 올때 제공된 간식인데 , 주로 과자 종류이긴한데 , 일반적으로 소매점에서 보기 힘든 종류의 스낵이기도 하고 , 매번 갈때 올떄 다르고 , 탈때 마다 달라서 , 오늘든 생각은 참 이런것을 구비하기도 힘들텐데 하는 생각이 문득 들었다 , 가격대도 예산에 맞아야 할테고 , 용량이나 포장 기타 기차안에서 먹기에 적당한 것들로 매일 두 종류로 준비해야할것이기때문이다. 그리고 오늘처럼 아이템이 뭔가 쉽게 접할수 없는 대만스러운 것들이어서도 그렇하다.

이런생각들이 꼬리를 물기 시작하다가 구매담당자의 고충이랄까 여기까지 미치게 되니 .. 내가 이런생각 까지 하면서 불편해 할 필요가 있나 하면서 거기서 생각을 접었지만 . 주위에 일어나는 일들에 그 이면과 그 설계자의 의도를 생각하다보면 , 평범하지 않은 다른 각도에서의 실체에 대한 생각들이 들때가 많다

책을 읽다보면 , 그 문장을 위해서 , 그 플롯의 필연성에 관해 작가가 고민했을 부분에 대해서

영화를 보면 , 그 장면을 통해서 , 그 대사로 의도했던 이면 , 왜 그런말을 했을까 하는 공부라면 공부고 , 고민이라면 고민인것들이 불쑥불쑥 스치고 지나간다.

헤어질 결심에서 “서래씨는 다른게 있어요, 꼿꼿해요 , 보통사람이 이렇게 꼿꼿한긴 힘든데” 라던가, 월레스와 그로밋에서 “Neat & Tidy ” ” No job is too small ” 이라고 외치는 노봇이라던가 , 그린북에서 학교에서 받은 트레이닝이 클래식이 전부였는데 라는 말에 , 무슨 트레이닝 , 수달이라도 된거냐는 말등등..

작꾸 돼뇌게 되는 대사들에 대해서 , 왜 그 말이어야 했는지 가 자꾸 궁금해지는것과 같은것들이 요즘 특히 더 그런데 , 요즘에 특히 달라진 점은 이런 글이 던지 , 일기를 쓰게 된이후로 , 한번더 깊게 생각하게 되어서 , 잠깐 스쳐가는 생각이었던것이 , 이렇게 이터레이션이 되면서 , 한꺼풀 정도는 벗겨서 보게 되는것이라고 해야겠다 . 한번더 생각해볼 여지가 생기면서 나의 인식과 이해의 바운더리가 조금을 넓어지는 느낌.

S &P 500 / 대만가권지수 /황금 시세의 5년 간의 상관성 을 보면 2021년 팬더믹 때에 금시세가 고정된것처럼 보이는 떄를 제외하면 , 경기에 따라 같이 가는 양상을 보인다 . 미국 주가 가 대만주가와 금시세의 에버러지를 가진것 처럼 가고 있는듯.

Ever since Ice Jao, a 30-year-old, got married two years ago, her mother has been pestering her to buy a home. The jewellery seller pays $425 a month to rent a flat about the size of two parking spaces on the outskirts of Taipei, the capital of Taiwan. She shares it with her husband and two cats. Her parents think that “only a house you own can really be a home”, she says. But Ms Jao is reluctant to become a wu nu, or “housing slave”, she says. That is slang for young homebuyers who feel trapped by their expensive mortgages.

Taiwan’s youngsters are not exaggerating when they call homeownership a burden. House prices on the island are exorbitant. In Taipei, median house prices are 16 times the median income. That is a higher ratio than New York (9.8), London (14), or Seoul (13). It is not much better outside the capital. The United Nations considers a housing price-to-income ratio of three to be affordable. But Taiwan’s national average is 11. Even its cheapest city, Keelung, has a ratio of 6.5. The average Taiwanese household spent nearly half of their disposable income on mortgage payments in the second quarter of 2024. In Taipei, they spent more than 70%.

Taiwan’s government has long promoted homeownership in line with traditional Chinese beliefs that land equals wealth and security, says Chang Chin-oh, a retired academic. “Everyone believes, ‘I must buy, or else I’m a loser’,” says Chen Taiyuan, an estate agent in Taipei who has run for parliament on a platform of housing-policy reform. As a result, nearly 85% of Taiwanese households live in homes that they own. That has paid off for older generations: average home prices in Taipei have tripled since 2000, according to one index.

Buyers today are unlikely to benefit in the same way. Taiwan’s population is shrinking, and foreigners are investing less in Taiwanese property. That means house prices are likely to fall. “There are already too many houses in Taiwan,” says Liao Ting-hui, who works for an urban-planning advocacy group. Taiwan has over 9m housing units for only about 8m households. One-fifth of homes are empty, according to the latest census. And nearly a quarter of properties built in the past five years are unoccupied. Wealthy buyers are hoarding empty flats, says Mr Liao.

The government has done little to stop such behaviour. Property owners pay higher taxes if they own four or more units, but the amounts they owe are puny. Taxes are calculated according to government-assessed land and building values that are decoupled from market prices and undervalued (as the methods of calculation have not changed for decades). The owner of a $900,000 house pays less in taxes than the owner of a $20,000 car, according to calculations by one think-tank.

Adjusting the tax system would be unpopular. Instead Taiwan’s government has focused on providing rent subsidies and social housing. In 2023 it also expanded a housing-loan programme for first-time buyers. That caused a spike in both prices and sales. Many young Taiwanese jumped into “crazy panic buying”, says Mr Liao. The central bank had to tighten credit controls last year. Since then sales have slowed. Meanwhile, young Taiwanese face an insecure rental market with few protections. Last year an index of rental prices in Taiwan hit an all-time high. ■

SINCE TAKING power in 2012, Xi Jinping has worked to purge corruption from the ranks of China’s armed forces. The country’s ability to fight and win wars depends on this effort, he has said. But even Mr Xi’s protégés, appointed to restore order, seem to be part of the rot. The latest sign came on November 28th, when the defence ministry announced that Admiral Miao Hua, one of China’s most senior officers (pictured, in white), had been suspended pending investigation for “serious violations of discipline”, often a euphemism for corruption. Ostracism or imprisonment will probably follow.

The news came just after reports that Admiral Dong Jun, the defence minister (a more junior position in China), was also under investigation. The ministry denied the claim as “sheer fabrication” and later noted that Admiral Dong had met foreign officials in Shanghai on December 5th. Rumours suggest other senior officers are under scrutiny. Defence-industry figures also seem to have disappeared.

The turmoil in China’s high command reinforces a belief among several senior American officials that China will not be ready to invade Taiwan in this decade, as some had feared. That is not to say that China will stop using military force to coerce and intimidate neighbours. On November 29th it sent a nuclear-capable H-6N bomber for the first time on a joint patrol with Russian aircraft over the Sea of Japan. Later this week it may launch another large military exercise around Taiwan, in a show of displeasure at America’s decision to allow the self-governing island’s president, Lai Ching-te, to stop in Hawaii and Guam during a tour of the Pacific.

Mr Xi has long resorted to purges to consolidate his grip on the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), and other levers of power, promising to go after all ranks—“tigers and flies” alike. Admiral Miao is a tiger, one of only six members of the Central Military Commission (CMC), China’s supreme military body, headed by Mr Xi himself.

The admiral may not be quite as large a beast as Generals Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong, both former vice-chairmen of the CMC, who were arrested for bribery in 2014 and 2015. The former died of cancer; the latter was sentenced to life in prison. But Admiral Miao’s suspected wrongdoing may be felt more keenly by Mr Xi.

The admiral rose through the ranks in Fujian province where Mr Xi also served. Under Mr Xi’s leadership, his ascent included an unusual move from the army to serve as the navy’s political commissar in 2014, a promotion to admiral in 2015 and elevation to the CMC in 2017, taking charge of the Political Work Department. This is the Communist Party’s ideological-enforcement arm. It oversees military personnel, promotions and the political commissars who shadow operational commanders in most units, ensuring the party’s “absolute leadership” over the armed forces.

Those associated with Admiral Miao will, inevitably, come under scrutiny. That may explain the rumours surrounding Admiral Dong. If he is removed he would become the third successive defence minister—and yet another Xi appointee—to be disgraced. The purge of Mr Xi’s favourites may suggest he is poor at choosing officers (though able to admit to mistakes). Or it may be a sign that corruption is so endemic that no senior officer is unblemished.

The cause of Admiral Miao’s downfall may never be revealed. PLA-watchers propose different interpretations. A narrow one, offered by Lonnie Henley of the Foreign Policy Research Institute in America, is that given his position Admiral Miao may have been caught in a “pay to play” scheme, where officers bribe superiors to obtain promotion. A broader thesis, set out by Andrew Erickson and Christopher Sharman of the US Naval War College, is that the anti-corruption campaign has moved from the PLA’s rocket force to the navy. If so, two of the most important components of the PLA’s modernisation have become engulfed in scandal, after last year’s purge of several rocket-force commanders.

Corruption, says Mr Erickson, “is not a bug, it’s an enduring feature of a system in which the Communist Party is inherently above the law”. The PLA’s expansion has created many opportunities for bribe-taking. In the past Mr Xi has blamed its failings on Westernised thinking and a lack of combat experience, but he may not have appreciated how far the rot had spread.

Mr Henley admits it is difficult to assess whether dishonesty merely raises the cost of running the PLA or causes more lasting damage by saddling it with underqualified officers and shoddy kit. Bloomberg, a news agency, reported in January on American intelligence assessments about Chinese missiles being filled with water and silos being fitted with doors that did not open properly. In September satellite imagery suggested a new submarine had sunk while under construction.

China aims to become a “world-class” military power by 2049. But Mr Xi has ordered the PLA to be ready to invade Taiwan by 2027, says the CIA. American military officials have long worried about a “window of vulnerability” in the second half of this decade, before new American bombers, subs and other weapons enter into service in substantial numbers in the 2030s.

In recent weeks, however, senior American military and government officials, speaking in off-the-record forums, have sounded sanguine. They suggest the disruption in the PLA’s upper ranks is evidence that Mr Xi does not yet have confidence in its ability to take Taiwan quickly and at acceptable cost. Other recent factors may give him pause, too. Among them are Russia’s failure to swiftly overrun Ukraine, Taiwan’s shift to a more defensive asymmetric military policy and America’s deepening military alliances in Asia. Above all, China’s economic woes and social discontent mean that Mr Xi is turning inward and wants stability abroad.

“The period of greatest danger has probably been pushed out for several years as Xi Jinping addresses the loyalty in his military and the corruption problems,” says Bonnie Glaser of the German Marshall Fund, a think-tank in Washington.

Such views are not universally shared, in or out of government, not least because Donald Trump’s return to power raises uncertainty about America’s alliances. Mr Erickson notes that past corruption scandals have not stopped China’s relentless military growth. “Politicised corruption investigations impact and impose costs on China’s military to the extent that some dirty laundry occasionally emerges—but are fundamentally a speed bump, not a showstopper,” he says. “Xi has his foot firmly on the accelerator and a full tank of gas.”