SINCE TAKING power in 2012, Xi Jinping has worked to purge corruption from the ranks of China’s armed forces. The country’s ability to fight and win wars depends on this effort, he has said. But even Mr Xi’s protégés, appointed to restore order, seem to be part of the rot. The latest sign came on November 28th, when the defence ministry announced that Admiral Miao Hua, one of China’s most senior officers (pictured, in white), had been suspended pending investigation for “serious violations of discipline”, often a euphemism for corruption. Ostracism or imprisonment will probably follow.
The news came just after reports that Admiral Dong Jun, the defence minister (a more junior position in China), was also under investigation. The ministry denied the claim as “sheer fabrication” and later noted that Admiral Dong had met foreign officials in Shanghai on December 5th. Rumours suggest other senior officers are under scrutiny. Defence-industry figures also seem to have disappeared.
The turmoil in China’s high command reinforces a belief among several senior American officials that China will not be ready to invade Taiwan in this decade, as some had feared. That is not to say that China will stop using military force to coerce and intimidate neighbours. On November 29th it sent a nuclear-capable H-6N bomber for the first time on a joint patrol with Russian aircraft over the Sea of Japan. Later this week it may launch another large military exercise around Taiwan, in a show of displeasure at America’s decision to allow the self-governing island’s president, Lai Ching-te, to stop in Hawaii and Guam during a tour of the Pacific.
Mr Xi has long resorted to purges to consolidate his grip on the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), and other levers of power, promising to go after all ranks—“tigers and flies” alike. Admiral Miao is a tiger, one of only six members of the Central Military Commission (CMC), China’s supreme military body, headed by Mr Xi himself.
The admiral may not be quite as large a beast as Generals Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong, both former vice-chairmen of the CMC, who were arrested for bribery in 2014 and 2015. The former died of cancer; the latter was sentenced to life in prison. But Admiral Miao’s suspected wrongdoing may be felt more keenly by Mr Xi.
The admiral rose through the ranks in Fujian province where Mr Xi also served. Under Mr Xi’s leadership, his ascent included an unusual move from the army to serve as the navy’s political commissar in 2014, a promotion to admiral in 2015 and elevation to the CMC in 2017, taking charge of the Political Work Department. This is the Communist Party’s ideological-enforcement arm. It oversees military personnel, promotions and the political commissars who shadow operational commanders in most units, ensuring the party’s “absolute leadership” over the armed forces.
Those associated with Admiral Miao will, inevitably, come under scrutiny. That may explain the rumours surrounding Admiral Dong. If he is removed he would become the third successive defence minister—and yet another Xi appointee—to be disgraced. The purge of Mr Xi’s favourites may suggest he is poor at choosing officers (though able to admit to mistakes). Or it may be a sign that corruption is so endemic that no senior officer is unblemished.
The cause of Admiral Miao’s downfall may never be revealed. PLA-watchers propose different interpretations. A narrow one, offered by Lonnie Henley of the Foreign Policy Research Institute in America, is that given his position Admiral Miao may have been caught in a “pay to play” scheme, where officers bribe superiors to obtain promotion. A broader thesis, set out by Andrew Erickson and Christopher Sharman of the US Naval War College, is that the anti-corruption campaign has moved from the PLA’s rocket force to the navy. If so, two of the most important components of the PLA’s modernisation have become engulfed in scandal, after last year’s purge of several rocket-force commanders.
Corruption, says Mr Erickson, “is not a bug, it’s an enduring feature of a system in which the Communist Party is inherently above the law”. The PLA’s expansion has created many opportunities for bribe-taking. In the past Mr Xi has blamed its failings on Westernised thinking and a lack of combat experience, but he may not have appreciated how far the rot had spread.
Mr Henley admits it is difficult to assess whether dishonesty merely raises the cost of running the PLA or causes more lasting damage by saddling it with underqualified officers and shoddy kit. Bloomberg, a news agency, reported in January on American intelligence assessments about Chinese missiles being filled with water and silos being fitted with doors that did not open properly. In September satellite imagery suggested a new submarine had sunk while under construction.
China aims to become a “world-class” military power by 2049. But Mr Xi has ordered the PLA to be ready to invade Taiwan by 2027, says the CIA. American military officials have long worried about a “window of vulnerability” in the second half of this decade, before new American bombers, subs and other weapons enter into service in substantial numbers in the 2030s.
In recent weeks, however, senior American military and government officials, speaking in off-the-record forums, have sounded sanguine. They suggest the disruption in the PLA’s upper ranks is evidence that Mr Xi does not yet have confidence in its ability to take Taiwan quickly and at acceptable cost. Other recent factors may give him pause, too. Among them are Russia’s failure to swiftly overrun Ukraine, Taiwan’s shift to a more defensive asymmetric military policy and America’s deepening military alliances in Asia. Above all, China’s economic woes and social discontent mean that Mr Xi is turning inward and wants stability abroad.
“The period of greatest danger has probably been pushed out for several years as Xi Jinping addresses the loyalty in his military and the corruption problems,” says Bonnie Glaser of the German Marshall Fund, a think-tank in Washington.
Such views are not universally shared, in or out of government, not least because Donald Trump’s return to power raises uncertainty about America’s alliances. Mr Erickson notes that past corruption scandals have not stopped China’s relentless military growth. “Politicised corruption investigations impact and impose costs on China’s military to the extent that some dirty laundry occasionally emerges—but are fundamentally a speed bump, not a showstopper,” he says. “Xi has his foot firmly on the accelerator and a full tank of gas.”
